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ABSTRACT 
It is usually accepted that conditional sentences are sui generis and enigmatic. In this paper I 
try to make them more accessible by interpreting them as claims to relations of implication 
restricted to a parameter world. This interpretation revives an old idea that fell into disuse, 
but in its improved version leads to refreshing solutions to known problems in conditional 
theory. The many benefits of this approach are evidenced by its insightful explanation of 
some counter-examples to classical argumentative forms (the paradoxes of material 
implication, antecedent strengthening, contraposition, hypothetical syllogism, conditional 
negation), conditional standoffs, the problem of counterfactuals, the referential/inferential 
nature of conditionals, the Apartheid thesis, the triviality results and conditionals embedding. 
1. INTRODUCTION  
It is usually accepted that unconditional 
statements are more accessible than 
conditional ones. Take for instance an 
unconditional sentence such as ‘The snow is 
white’. The fact that snow is white is the 
truthmaker responsible for the truth of this 
sentence . But what would be the 
truthmakers of a conditional such as ‘If it 
rains, the match will be cancelled’? It is not 
obvious there is such a thing as a 
conditional fact, or even a conditional state 
of affairs. The other problem is that unlike 
unconditional sentences, conditionals seem 
to have a dual nature. They are used to 
represent reality, but they are also inferential 
in nature. So are conditionals statements or 
arguments? If I attribute a high probability 
to a sentence, I believe in it. But what would 
mean to say that a conditional has a high 
probability? One reasonable guess is that 
the probability of a conditional, say, ‘If it 
rains, the match will be cancelled’, is 
measured by the conditional probability of 
the consequent given the antecedent. This 
hypothesis looks promising for ten minutes, 
but it turns out that if ever existed such a 
conditional, its probability would end up 
being the same as the probability of its mere 
consequent . This is absurd, because the 1
probability that the match will be cancelled 
given that it rains is not the same as the 
probability that the match will be cancelled. 
We simply don’t understand conditionals.  
In this paper I will try to offer a way out 
of this nightmare by arguing that 
conditionals are perfectly natural when they 
are explained as claims to implications 
restricted to a parameter world. This 
interpretation allows us to offer a clear 
picture of the basic nature of conditionals. 
The article will be divided by small sections 
as follows: (section 2) conditionals as 
implication; (section 3) the paradoxes of 
material implication, (section 4) antecedent 
strengthening, (section 5) contraposition, 
(section 6) hypothetical syllogism, (section 
7) conditional negation, (section 8) 
conditional standoffs, (section 9) the 
 See Lewis (1976: 299–300).1
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problem of counterfactuals, (section 10) the 
referential/inferential nature of conditionals, 
(section 11) the Apartheid thesis, (section 
12) the triviality results and (section 13) 
conditionals embedding, (section 14) 
conclusion. 
2. IFS AS CLAIMS OF RESTRICTED 
IMPLICATION 
Intuitively, conditional statements express 
some sort of deductive reasoning, but the 
prec ise na ture of th is re la t ion i s 
controversial. It seems obvious that if p 
entails q, p → q  is necessarily true, and 2
inversely, if p → q is necessarily true, p 
entails q. This relation, however, doesn’t 
hold in most cases, since most true 
conditionals are not necessarily true. Is there 
some other connection between the two 
though? Mackie suggested that conditionals 
are condensed arguments. Thus, to accept ‘if 
p then q’ is to be willing to infer that q while 
discovering that p. In this sense, the 
conditional ‘If it rains, the street is wet’ 
would express an inference we would be 
willing to perform given the assumption that 
it rains, and not a belief on a proposition . 3
Ryle defended a similar view by suggesting 
that conditional sentences are like 
inferential tickets. To accept ‘if p then q’ is 
to find out that one is entitled to argue that 
‘p, therefore q’, given the condition that the 
premise p is obtained. The reasoner does not 
actually need to make the inference she is 
entitled to, in the same way that an owner of 
a railway ticket does not need to use it to 
travel, even though she would be entitled 
to . 4
Other philosophers also highlighted 
conditionals’ relationship with arguments, 
but were cagier about its precise nature. For 
instance, Strawson proposed that ‘if p, then 
q’ conventionally implies the existence of a 
ground-consequence relation between the 
two propositions and means the same as ‘p, 
so q’ . The hypothesis is that if ‘p, so q’ is a 5
conventional argument-form, ‘if p, then q’ 
would be the conventional quasi-argument-
form, and that the only difference between 
the two is that the premises of a quasi-
argument-form are ‘entertained rather than 
asserted’. Strawson thinks that this would 
explain why we may hesitate to call 
conditional statements true, and prefer to 
call them ‘reasonable or well-founded’ . 6
One attempt to establish this relation 
between conditionals and arguments is to 
emphasise its relationship with modus 
ponens. Hare hinted at this idea when he 
said that ‘to understand the ‘If … , then’ 
form of sentence is to understand the place 
that it has in logic (to understand its logical 
properties). It is, in fact, to understand the 
operation of modus ponens and related 
inferences’ . Jackson endorsed a similar 7
view according to which the acceptance of p 
→ q is measured by our willingness to 
employ it on a modus ponens. He argued for 
the importance of modus ponens as 
condition for the assertibility of conditionals 
using the concept of robustness: p → q is 
acceptable when q is robust with respect to 
p, i.e., when Pr(q) is high and would remain 
high after learning that p. In this sense, p → 
q would only be acceptable when it can be 
employed on a modus ponens inference . 8
 Here ‘→’ stands for natural language conditionals, and ‘⊨’ stands for entailment. I will use p, q, r…. for both 2
sentence letters and propositional variables—the context will make it clear which one is being used.
 Mackie (1973: 81).3
 Ryle (1950: 312).4
 Strawson (1952: 35).5
 Strawson (1952: 83).6
 Hare (1970: 16).7
 Jackson (1987: 26–31). 8
!2
It is fair to say then that despite the 
prevalent Quinean view that rigidly 
extricates conditionals from arguments, the 
association between the two was perceived 
as natural by multiple authors. In fact, the 
supposed differences between conditionals 
and arguments are usually exaggerated. 
Sometimes it is said that a conditional ‘if p, 
then q’ does not involve an assertion of p 
and q, while an argument ‘p, therefore q’, 
involves both an assertion of p and q, and an 
additional assertion that p implies q. But 
this interpretation has some problems. First, 
it ignores that a commitment to the truth-
values of p and q can be expressed on the 
terms employed even if neither p nor q are 
asserted, e.g., ‘q because p’, ‘given p, q’, 
etc. Second, it would mean that expressions 
such as ‘p, therefore q’ contain three 
assertions, instead of one. In fact, it would 
imply that the word ‘therefore’ alone should 
be read as ‘p strictly implies q’, which is 
absurd. We could instead interpret ‘p, 
therefore q’ as meaning only ‘p strictly 
implies q’, where p and q are not asserted, 
just mentioned. The commitment to p and q 
is expressed, but not stated. 
Whatever way you look at it; it is part of 
the meaning of a conditional that the 
consequent follows from the antecedent in 
some sense to be specified. This intuition is 
reinforced by the fact that the terms that are 
usually associated with the protasis (‘if’, 
‘given that’, ‘when’, ‘antecedent’, etc.) or 
the apodosis (‘then’, ‘consequent’) should 
be interpreted as indicative of premise(s) 
and conclusion, respectively. The strict 
implication view advanced by Clarence 
Lewis states that the consequent follows 
from the antecedent in the same sense that a 
conclusion deductively follows from the 
premise of an argument . I t is an 
understandable mistake, since it tries to 
emulate the notion of entailment into the 
meaning of conditionals in order to do 
justice to the intuition that they involve 
some sort of implication, but it is a mistake 
nonetheless. Lewis view is unsatisfactory 
and somewhat ad hoc because it leaves no 
room for the specific role of conditionals in 
deductive arguments. In this proposal, 
conditionals will exhibit the same 
entailment relations of the deductive 
arguments to which they take part, but this 
is implausible since conditionals are not 
deductive arguments.  
The notion of material implication 
advanced by Russell is more promising in 
that regard. It offers a notion of implication 
that is somewhat associated with our 
intuitions about entailment, but that it also 
manages to have i ts own dis t inct 
characteristics. The only aspects in which 
Russell’s characterisation was lacking are 
the modal distinctions that highlight both 
the similarities and differences between 
material implication and entailment. As it 
happens, these distinctions will also provide 
a compelling strategy to explain away the 
counter-intuitive aspects of conditionals. 
One premise p materially implies a 
conclusion q if, and only if, it is not the case 
that both p is true and q is false in a given 
world that is assumed as a parameter. This is 
a relation of material implication. This 
reference to a parameter world is justified 
by the fact that when we evaluate arguments 
that contain a material implication in the 
premise, we consider all the possible worlds 
in which the premise is true. The set of 
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these possible worlds might include the 
actual world, but don’t need to be restricted 
by it . The relation of formal implication is 9
slightly different. One premise p formally 
implies a conclusion q if, and only if, it is 
not the case that p is true and q is false in 
any possible world.  
We can say then that in a material 
implication the relation of logical 
consequence is restricted to a parameter 
world, whereas in a formal implication the 
relation of logical consequence is 
unrestricted and extends over many worlds. 
One way to talk about this distinction is to 
maintain that formal and material 
implication are the same type of implication 
presented in two degrees. In the first degree, 
we have what is usually referred to as the 
relation of material implication, which is 
restricted by a parameter world. In the 
second degree, we have what is known as a 
relation of formal implication, which 
ensures that in every possible world in 
which their premises are true, their truth is 
preserved. The important thing is that the 
same pattern of implication presented in 
first degree is repeated in the second degree. 
Thus, instead of relying on a distinction 
between material and formal implication, 
we can adopt a distinction between 
implications in first and second degree.  
Conditional sentences are claims to a 
deductive inference, which means that the 
assertion of a conditional contains the 
implicit claim that the antecedent (or 
premise) necessitates the consequent (or 
conclusion) relatively to the parameter 
world. The fact that the claim to a 
necessitation relation is restricted to a given 
world does not alter the dynamic. 
C o n d i t i o n a l s a r e a rg u m e n t s , n o t 
connectives. If they happen to be used in 
arguments, it’s because we make arguments 
that involve arguments either as a premise 
or a conclusion, or both. 
One could object that even if it is 
conceded that conditionals are claims to 
implication restricted to the actual world, 
necessitation is a requirement that is too 
strong for most conditionals that are about 
matters of fact. There is an easy way to 
address this worry by adding a probability 
qualification in the consequent in such 
cases. In these cases, p entails that q is more 
likely relatively to the parameter world. We 
are still thinking in terms of implication, a 
notion that is more accessible and direct 
than the quicksand of condit ional 
probability and related intuitions.  
3. THE PARADOXES OF MATERIAL 
IMPLICATION  
Let’s consider the first paradox of material 
implication, i.e., the argumentative form ¬p 
⊨ p → q. One apparent counterexample to 
this argumentative form is ‘Some John did 
not drink poison. Therefore, if John drinks 
poison, it will be good for his health’. 
Intuitively, the conclusion is false. But let’s 
analyse this argumentative form interpreting 
conditionals as implications restricted to a 
parameter world. The first paradox can be 
interpreted as claiming that that in every 
possible world in which ¬p is true, p 
implies q in that parameter world. The 
conclusion of the argument seems false if 
we conceive a world where p is true, but 
this modal intuition is motivated by poor 
reasoning. This way of thinking ignores that 
Another reason is that possible world theories always redirect us to the closest-p world to evaluate the truth 9
value of a conditional, but in this p-world the relation of implication between p and q is also material. In order to 
make sense of the classical use of material implication and differentiate it from its use in possible world 
theories, we observe that in the second, but not in the first, the parameter world is always the closest one where 
p is true. In order to make sense of the classical use of material implication and differentiate it from its use in 
possible world theories, we observe that in the second, but not in the first, the parameter world is always the 
closest one where p is true.
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the world parameters in this case is a world 
where p is false, not true. 
The argumentative form, q ⊨ p → q, is 
classically valid, but has counter-intuitive 
instances in natural language such as ‘The 
match will not be cancelled. Therefore, if 
the players broke their legs, the match will 
not be cancel led . ’ Let ’s ca l l th is 
argumentative form the second paradox of 
material implication. The second paradox 
can be interpreted as claiming that that in 
every possible world in which q is true, p 
implies q in that parameter world. The 
apparent counter-example seems plausible if 
we ignore that this claim to implication is 
restricted to parameter worlds in which q is 
true. Since in those worlds the match is not 
cancelled, the assumption that the players 
broke their legs is also false. Once again the 
contrary intuition is motivated by a modal 
illusion and poor reasoning: what seems 
obvious results from an illicit shift in the 
parameter world.  
4. ANTECEDENT STRENGTHENING 
This reasoning also allows us to explain the 
counter-examples against c lass ical 
argumentative forms in a principled manner. 
Consider antecedent strengthening: p → q ⊨ 
(p&r) → q. This argumentative form faces 
the following counter-example: ‘If the 
match is struck it will light. Therefore, if the 
match is struck and it is held under water, it 
will light’. In order to understand what is 
wrong with this counter-example, let’s take 
a step back and consider one feature of 
deductive validity, namely, monotonicity. If 
p → q and p deductively entails q, this 
implication will persist notwithstanding 
add i t i ona l i n fo rma t ion , i nc lud ing 
information that may render one of the 
premises false. Thus, the following instance 
of modus ponens will preserve the truth of 
the premise, ‘If the match is struck, it will 
light. The match is struck. Therefore, it will 
light’. Now, if we add an additional premise 
that makes the conclusion false, the 
argument will still be valid. Thus, the 
following instance of modus ponens is valid, 
‘If the match is struck, it will light. The 
match is struck. The match is held under 
water. Therefore, it will light’. This 
argument is somewhat counter-intuitive 
because the truth of the additional premise 
is incompatible with a background condition 
required for the conclusion, i.e., that the 
match is dry. But then again, if this premise 
is true, the conclusion is false, but so is the 
first premise. So there is no conceivable 
circumstance where all premises are true 
and the conclusion is false. Therefore, the 
counter-example is merely apparent.   
The same reasoning holds for the 
implication restricted to a parameter world. 
If p → q is true, p implies q in a parameter 
world and the addition of another premise 
will not make this implication invalid. Thus, 
if the implication ‘If the match is struck it 
will light’ is valid, it will remain valid given 
the addition of the premise that the match is 
held under water. This is somewhat counter-
intuitive, because we know that under 
typical background conditions, the 
strengthened conditional will not have a true 
antecedent and a true consequent. However, 
this not a counter-example, since the 
strengthened conditional will only be false 
with a true antecedent and a false 
consequent, and in this circumstance the 
premise is also false. Or to put in other 
words, in the only circumstance where the 
attempt of implication exhibited by the 
strengthened conditional is invalid is also a 
circumstance where the attempt of 
implication exhibited by the premise is also 
invalid. The validity of antecedent 
strengthening can be explained as a form of 
monotonicity related to the relations of the 
implication in the premise and in the 
conclusion. The reason why antecedent 
strengthening is perceived as invalid is that 
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the implication restricted to a parameter 
world is monotonic, while the evidential 
support between the antecedent and the 
consequent is not. If the evidential support 
may well be undone by additional findings, 
the implication still holds. But we can’t 
approach deductive logic as nonmonotonic 
logic. 
5. CONTRAPOSITION  
Contraposition allows us to infer ¬q → ¬p 
from p → q. This argumentative form has 
counter-intuitive instances such as ‘If it 
rains tomorrow there will not be a terrific 
cloudburst. Therefore, if there is a terrific 
cloudburst tomorrow it will not rain’ . The 10
conclusion seems false if we consider a 
parameter world where the antecedent is 
true, but the premise is only true in a 
parameter world where the antecedent is 
false. Thus, we can’t have an evaluation in 
which the premise is true and the conclusion 
is false if they involve the same parameter 
worlds.  
6. HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISM 
Consider now Hypothetical Syllogism: p → 
q, q → r ⊨ p → r. This argumentative form 
has counter-intuitive instances such as the 
following: ‘If Brown wins the election, 
Smith will retire to private life. If Smith dies 
before the election, Brown will win it. 
Therefore, if Smith dies before the election, 
then he will retire to private life.’ One could 
plausibly accept both premises, but reject 
the conclusion. It is absurd to suppose that 
Smith could decide to retire after he died . 11
The counterexample does not work, 
since the premises and the conclusion are 
not evaluated in the same parameter world. 
Suppose that the conclusion is false, i.e., 
that it has a true antecedent and a false 
consequent. In this case, Smith will not be 
able to retire, because he will die before the 
election takes place. The first premise has a 
false consequent and the second premise has 
a true antecedent. It remains to be seen 
whether Brown will win the election in this 
context. If he does, the first premise will 
have a true antecedent and a false 
consequent, and the second premise must be 
true, since the antecedent is true and the 
consequent is true. Therefore, at least one of 
the premises will be false. There is no 
counterexample. 
7. CONDITIONAL NEGATION 
In classical logic, ¬(p → q) entails p&¬q. 
This argumentative form faces counter-
intuitive instances when someone accepts 
the premise due to intensional evidence, but 
the conclusion is a conjunction he ignores. 
For example, if I deny the conditional ‘If 
God exists then the prayers of evil men will 
be answered’ I must admit that, ‘God exists 
and the prayers of evil men will not be 
answered’ . Thus, from the negation of a 12
simple conditional, I can prove that God 
exists. This is implausible, because someone 
could refuse the conditional based on 
assumptions about the moral dispositions of 
God even if she does not believe in the 
existence of God.  
Let’s that a person believes that God’s 
moral d ispos i t ions are essent ia l ly 
inconsistent with answering the prayers of 
evil men. The conditional then is interpreted 
as deductive argument such as ‘There is no 
possible world in which God exists but the 
prayers of evil men are not answered’, 
which can be accepted without any 
commitment to the truth-values of either its 
premise or conclusion in the actual world. 
In other words, the counter-example is 
motivated by a simple mistake. It confuses a 
Adams (1975: 15).10
 Adams (1965: 166).11
 Stevenson (1970: 28).12
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conditional, which is a claim to an 
implication restricted to a parameter world, 
with a claim to an unrestricted implication. 
8. CONDITIONALS STAND-OFF 
In very loose terms, conditional stand offs 
occur when one individual has grounds to 
accept p → q, while another has equally 
compelling grounds to accept what seems to 
be the opposite conditional, p → ¬q. If 
conditionals have truth conditions, p → q 
and p → ¬q cannot both be true, because 
they seem contradictory. The reasoning then 
is that in order for one of the conditionals to 
be false, someone would have to make a 
mistake about the facts of the case. 
However, both individuals have perfect 
good reasons to accept each conditional. If 
none of them is making a mistake, none of 
them is saying something false. Therefore, 
conditionals have no truth conditions. This 
puzzle is evidenced in the following 
example : 13
Sly Pete and Mr. Stone are playing poker on 
a Mississippi riverboat. It is now up to Pete 
to call or fold. My henchman Zack sees 
Stone's hand, which is quite good, and 
signals its content to Pete. My henchman 
Jack sees both hands, and sees that Pete's 
hand is rather low, so that Stone's is the 
winning hand. At this point, the room is 
cleared. (…) Zack knows that Pete knew 
Stone's hand. He can thus appropriately 
assert ‘If Pete called, he won.’ Jack knows 
that Pete held the losing hand, and thus can 
appropriately assert ‘If Pete called, he lost.’ 
From this, we can see that neither is 
asserting anything false. 
There is a caveat with this example though. 
It is arguable that the example is not really 
symmetric because Jack has better reasons 
to justify his belief than Zack. This lead to 
attempts to offer new stand off examples 
which ensured perfect symmetry :  14
In a game, (1) all red square cards are worth 
10 points, and (2) all large square cards are 
worth nothing. X caught a glimpse as Z 
picked a card and saw that it was red. 
Knowing (1), he believes ‘If Z picked a 
square card, it’s worth 10 points’. Y, seeing 
it bulging under Z’s jacket, where Z is 
keeping it out of view, knows it’s large. 
Knowing (2), he believes ‘If Z picked a 
square card, it’s worth nothing’. 
The obvious response is that one can have 
epistemic bad luck even if she hadn’t done 
nothing. You can ‘do your job’ as an 
epistemic agent and still be wrong if the 
context is somewhat averse to your belief 
justification process. Moreover, if both 
statements are interpreted as claims to 
implication they can both be correct if their 
common premises turn out to be false, i.e., 
if Z didn’t pick a square card. Otherwise, 
notwithstanding X and Y good epistemic 
practices, one of the conditionals will have a 
true premise and a false conclusion, and one 
of them will be mistaken.  
9. THE PROBLEM OF 
COUNTERFACTUALS 
How can we verify a conditional when the 
antecedent is contrary-to-fact?  Consider 15
the following example: suppose that my 
friend almost touched a live wire. I say, with 
a sign of relief: ‘If you had touched that 
wire, you would get an electric shock’. How 
are we supposed to confirm the conditional 
if you did not touch the wire? There is the 
intuition that what really interest us is 
knowing whether she would get an electric 
shock in a hypothetical circumstance where 
she touched the wire. This intuition can be 
interpreted as a demand for knowing 
 Gibbard (1981: 226–32).13
 Edgington (1995: 294).14
 Chisholm (1946), Goodman (1947), Will (1947), Watling (1957), Walters (1961), Tredwell (1965).  15
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whether the premise of the conditional 
would imply the conclusion in a world 
where the premise is true. But this is simple 
a matter of knowing which world is taken as 
a parameter. If the arguer wants to know 
whether the implication is valid in a 
parameter world where the antecedent is 
true, and the antecedent is false in the actual 
world, then the actual world is irrelevant; 
otherwise, it is not irrelevant and the 
implication is vacuously valid. The notion 
that the only implication conveyed is one 
where the premise is true is misguided and 
confuses logic with epistemological 
considerations. The important thing is that 
while evaluating an argument, the premise 
and the conclusion are analysed in the same 
parameter world.  
One could insist that only possible 
world theories are adequate to capture this 
intuition, but this is a mistake. For some 
strange reason people assume that only 
possible world theories are allowed to make 
use of modal intuitions, and these are the 
only correct modal intuitions. The limits of 
this point of view become clear when we 
consider the evaluation of a simples modus 
tollens argument. In these cases there are no 
possible worlds where both p → q and ¬q 
are true, but ¬p is false, but all the possible 
worlds where p → q and ¬q are true, are 
worlds where ¬p is true. Otherwise, the first 
premise would contain a true antecedent and 
a false consequent. Thus, the only 
meaningful way to make sense of a simple 
modus tollens argument is to abandon 
possible world theories.  
10. THE REFERENTIAL/INFERENTIAL 
NATURE OF CONDITIONALS 
Conditionals seem to have a dual nature. On 
one hand, they are used to represent reality, 
so they have categorical-like features; but 
on the other hand, they are also inferential 
in nature, so they can be also interpreted as 
arguments. So are conditionals statements 
or arguments? Maybe both? We have a tried 
and tested metaphysical vocabulary that 
allow us to make sense of the truth value 
distinctions of categorical sentences and 
their connection to reality. But when we try 
to extend this vocabulary to conditional 
sentences, it falls apart. 
The present interpretation provides an 
easy answer for this problem: conditional 
statements are claims to a relation of 
implication between two propositions, the 
premise (antecedent) and the conclusion 
(consequent). In other words, they are 
statements about how one proposition 
ensures the truth of another in a parameter 
world. There is no need to resort to a dual 
nature, for they are categorical statements 
about facts associated with implication. A 
conditional corresponds to reality if the 
premise implies the consequent, otherwise 
they do not. 
11. THE APARTHEID THESIS 
The Apartheid thesis states that indicative 
and subjunctive conditionals have different 
truth conditions. One of the main arguments 
that have been presented to support this 
thesis are the Adam pairs. Consider the 
following pair of conditionals:  
 (1) If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, 
someone else did.  
 (2) If Oswald had not killed Kennedy, 
someone else would have.  
 Intuitively, these conditionals have different 
truth conditions. After all, in order to accept 
(1) is enough to know that Kennedy was 
killed by someone, but to accept (2) is 
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necessary to assume a conspiracy theory 
regarding its murder . 16
The intuition that supports the Apartheid 
thesis can be explained away in the 
following manner: since an indicative ‘if p 
is the case, then q is the case’ should be 
interpreted as saying ‘p implies q in a 
parameter world’, it is also natural to think 
that a subjunctive ‘if p were the case, then q 
would be the case’ should be interpreted as 
saying ‘if p were true, p would imply q in a 
parameter world’. But one can accept that p 
implies q in a parameter world, at the same 
she denies that if p were true, p would imply 
q in a parameter world. The error is in 
assuming that the fact that the antecedent is 
knowingly false makes any difference to the 
type of claim involving in an implication.   
The implication heuristic nullifies 
approaches that give too much importance 
to the grammatical aspects of different 
conditionals since they are all removed from 
the expanded propositional content. The 
proposi t ional content of complete 
conditionals does not admit the subjunctive 
mode of the propositions involved in the 
implication. For instance, we cannot say 
‘The proposition ‘Kennedy were not killed 
by Oswald’ entails ‘Someone else would 
have killed Kennedy’, since this is 
ungrammatical. But if the full propositional 
content removes the subjunctive mode, then 
all theoretical intuitions motivated by the 
subjunctive mode are eliminated as a 
consequence. 
12. THE TRIVIALITY RESULT 
The thesis known as the Equation states that 
the probability of p → q is the probability of 
q given p . Lewis has shown that the 17
acceptance of the equation implies that the 
probability of p → q is the probability of q, 
which is implausible: the probability of a 
conditional cannot plausibly be the same as 
the probability of its consequent, e.g., the 
probability that the match will light given 
that is struck is not intuitively the same as 
the probability that it will light .  18
However, we can show that a similar 
result it is not only expected, but intuitively 
satisfactory if we interpret conditionals as 
implications restricted to a parameter world. 
In order to realize this task we need to make 
some assumptions. First, let’s assume that 
conditional probability is primitive, i.e., that 
Pr(q/p) can’t be defined as Pr(p&q)/Pr(p). 
Intuitively, I can attribute a high probability 
to q given the assumption of p even if I 
don’t know the probability of p. For 
instance, I can attribute a high probability to 
the ceremony being cancelled tomorrow 
given the assumption that there will be a 
heavy rainfall, even if I don’t know the 
probability that there will be a heavy rainfall 
tomorrow. Thus, saying that we are 
considering the probability of q given p 
amounts to saying that we are evaluating the 
probability of q in a context where p is 
taken as true. Now, if we accept that p → q 
is equivalent to ¬p ∨ q, and the equation, it 
follows that the probability of ¬p ∨ q equals 
the probability of q given p. But the 
probability of ¬p ∨  q is the same as the 
probability of B in a context where p is 
taken as true. Or, to put in other words, if p 
is assumed as true, the probability of ¬p ∨ q 
is the same as the probability of q. Now, we 
already agreed that p → q is equivalent to 
¬p ∨  q. Consequently, if p is assumed as 
true, the probability of p → q is the same as 
the probability of q. QED 
13. CONDITIONALS EMBEDDING 
 Lewis (1973: 3). This example is a modification of the original example presented by Adams (1970: 90). 16
Hence the name ‘Adam pairs’.  
 See Jeffrey (1964: 702–703).17
 See Lewis (1976: 299–300).18
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Now let’s consider the phenomenon of 
embedded conditionals. Some will argue 
that the if conditionals were regular truth-
valuable sentences, conditional embedding 
would not be so rare and obscure . But if 19
conditionals are interpreted as claims to 
i m p l i c a t i o n t h i s r a r i t y b e c o m e s 
understandable. If arguments that contain an 
argument in either its premises or 
conc lu s ion a r e p r e t t y unusua l i n 
theorisation, imagine in natural language. 
But they can be made intelligible with the 
implication heuristic, even if they turn out 
to be convoluted. For instance, the 
conditional p → (q → r) can be interpreted 
as ‘p implies that q implies r in a parameter 
world’. This provide us with a clear 
rationale to interpret successive reiterations 
of embedding in conditionals, with 
increasing orders of complexity. We can 
explain conditionals in embedding contexts 
as composed assertions of implication 
restricted to parameter worlds. Just as we 
may have one or more premises in an 
argument, we may have one more 
proposition in an antecedent or consequente. 
This is another puzzle that was laid to rest. 
14. SUMMING UP 
Interpreting conditionals as claims to 
implication restricted to a parameter world 
h ig h l i g h t s t h e f l ex ib l e n a tu r e o f 
conditionals, for we can ascertain their truth 
values in different worlds. It also brings 
formal implication closer to conditionals, 
since they are simply the same type of 
implication without being restricted to a 
single world. And, on top of it all, it allows 
us to explain away counter-examples and 
puzzles that have plagued conditional 
experts for centuries.  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